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Abstract
Background: Much emphasis is put on providing evidence to assist policymakers in priority setting
and investment decisions. Assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions is one technique used
by policymakers in their decisions around the allocation of scarce resources. However, even where
such evidence is available, other considerations may also be taken into account, and even over-ride
technical evidence. Antiretroviral therapy (ART) is the most effective intervention to reduce HIV-
related morbidity and prolong mortality. However, treatment provision in the developing world
has been hindered by the high costs of services and drugs, casting doubts on its cost-effectiveness.
This paper looks at Thailand's publicly-funded antiretroviral initiative which was first introduced in
1992, and explores the extent to which cost-effectiveness evidence influenced policy.
Methods: This article reviews the development of the national ART programme in Thailand
between 1992 and 2004. It examines the roles of cost-effectiveness information in treatment policy
decisions. Qualitative approaches including document analysis and interview of key informants
were employed.
Results: Two significant policy shifts have been observed in government-organised ART provision.
In 1996, service-based therapy for a few was replaced by a research network to support clinical
assessments of antiretroviral medication in public hospitals. This decision was taken after a
domestic study illustrated the unaffordable fiscal burden and inefficient use of resources in
provision of ART. The numbers of treatment recipients was maintained at 2,000 per year
throughout the 1990s. It was not until 2001 that a new government pledged to extend the numbers
receiving the service, as part of its commitment to universal coverage. Several elements played a
role in this decision: new groups of dominant actors, drug price reductions, a pro-active civil society
movement, lessons from experience on treatment benefits, and global treatment advocacy. Unlike
previous policy discourse, human rights, ethics and equity notions were explicitly raised to support
therapy extension.
Conclusion: In the early decision, moving from a relatively limited ART service to a research
network was clearly influenced by cost-effectiveness data. But in the 2001 decision to include ART
in the universal coverage package, cost-effectiveness arguments were over-ruled by other
considerations. Thai ART policy was shaped by many factors, and was not a simple rational process
which relied on evidence.
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Background
While human immune-deficiency virus (HIV) infection is
incurable, use of antiretrovirals (ARVs) is the most effec-
tive intervention to prolong patients' lives. Combination
antiretroviral therapy (ART), widely introduced in devel-
oped countries since the mid-1990s, has resulted in a dra-
matic decline in opportunistic diseases and therefore HIV-
related mortality [1,2]. Furthermore, treated patients
regain close-to-normal quality of life including working
capacity [3]. Given that HIV largely affects younger-mid-
dle aged adults, expanding treatment access would pre-
vent breakdown of societal structure and restore
economic development.
Despite potentially desirable outcomes, ART provision in
developing countries is limited: by the end of 2005 only
20% of the global population in need had accessed to
therapy [4]. Scarce resources are crucial impediments, hin-
dering treatment expansion. The introduction of ARVs
and related services in poor settings requires not only
long-term financial commitment to accommodate recur-
rent costs, but also the investment in health service infra-
structure and workforce [5]. Given that there are many
essential interventions competing for the same budget,
policy makers are faced with difficult decisions in priority
setting and resource allocation across health programmes.
While policy decisions in the developing world's health
systems have been enhanced by the increasing availability
of findings from research studies [6], these are still lim-
ited. In the case of HIV, the lack of current, setting-specific
economic evaluations of existing interventions may have
impeded decision-making, especially in poor countries
where the efficient use of scarce resources is crucially
needed [7]. Restricted ART provision in these settings is
one of the reasons for the difficulties in conducting cost-
effectiveness studies of treatment in the early stage of the
epidemic. However, while the lack of economic analysis
may be an obstacle in decision making, in practice poli-
cies can, and often are, made without this sort of evidence.
This paper describes the development of the publicly-sub-
sidised ART programme in Thailand, and examines the
role of cost-effectiveness information and other sorts of
evidence in policy making. It draws on a larger research
study undertaken by the first author as a PhD thesis [8].
Document review and analysis was a key approach for
gathering the information on the context and evolution of
the treatment programme and the introduction of
research-based treatment – the so-called the Clinical
Research Network – during 1996 to 1999. Government
documents and evaluations as well as independent
research reports and media articles provided background
data. Information gathered was tested and triangulated
through semi-structured interviews and participant obser-
vation at both national and provincial levels. Interviewees
were identified through initial document analysis and
then using snowball techniques. All the key politicians
(including the Minister of Health) and senior bureaucrats
involved in the policy process on ARV were interviewed,
as well as others identified as relevant to the policy proc-
esses, including HIV experts and representatives of civil
society organisations. In all 40 individuals were inter-
viewed at the national level. Most interviews were taped,
transcribed and then subjected to content analysis.
International movement for ART scaling up in 
poor countries
Although ART had been adopted as standard care for AIDS
patients in industrialised societies in the late 1990s, it
remained inaccessible among most PLWHA in poor set-
tings. In 1996 Brazil became the first developing country
which provided universal coverage for ARV-based medica-
tion [9]. Following Brazil, pilot treatment programmes
were initiated in several countries between the late 1990s
and early 2002 [10-13]. Despite achievement in ART
extension in some Latin American and the Caribbean
nations [14], treatment coverage increased only slowly in
most parts of the developing world, where the demand
was overwhelming [4]. The high prices of the drugs and
resource scarcity were two factors contributing to such
limited development in treatment scaling up.
Global agencies were key players in improving access to
HIV treatment and care including ART, for example the
establishment of the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)' Drug Access Initiative in 1997; and
Accelerating Access Initiative in 2000 [15,16]. Further-
more, small-scale and research-based ART schemes were
implemented by academic and medical institutes, donors,
regional and national governments, private business, and
NGOs including faith-based communities in many Latin
American and African countries.
The scale up of ARV medication in poor settings was facil-
itated after the instigation of the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002, and
the launch of WHO's policy in 2003 to get 3 million
PLWHA on treatment by 2005 – the so-called 3 by 5 initi-
ative [17]. During the same period many HIV treatment
schemes were instigated through organizations such as
the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEP-
FAR) and the Clinton and Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tions [4]. Although the 3 by 5 target was not achieved
treatment coverage in the developing world was extended
significantly, from only 2% of the population in need in
2001 to 15% in 2005 [4].
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ART in Thai context: treatment programme 
evolution
HIV in Thailand moved rapidly from a concentrated epi-
demic in the early 1980s among high-risk groups such as
male homosexuals, intravenous drug users and commer-
cial sex workers, to a generalised epidemic in the begin-
ning of 1990s [18]. Owing to effective prevention
programmes such as condom promotion, public informa-
tion and targeted education, the number of new infections
fell dramatically from the mid-1990s. Much of Thailand's
success in slowing the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been
attributed to the open policy environment which pro-
moted these programmes. Despite this declining trend, in
2005 the estimated numbers of HIV-afflicted persons and
AIDS cases were 600,000 and 70,000, respectively [19].
These projections of HIV/AIDS cases included the
assumption that people's risky behaviour and the Thai
government policy on HIV prevention and treatment
would not change from the baseline, of 2001 – the year
these projections were carried out. Note that at that time
ART access under the national programme was still lim-
ited.
The national response to the disease evolved over time,
and initial efforts focused on prevention. But in 1992, a
limited, public-sector ART programme was implemented,
offering zidovudine (AZT) monotherapy to people living
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in low-income groups [20]. The
number of patients enrolled in this programme rose from
350 in the first year to 3,600 in 1995. See figure 1. This
publicly-funded ART programme was terminated in 1996
because of concerns about quality of care and costs [20],
and the Health Ministry reallocated its ART budget to
what was called the Clinical Research Network – shifting
the focus from treatment to the evaluation and monitor-
ing of treatment. Fifty hospitals in Bangkok and other
provinces were selected to assess the effectiveness and
safety of dual-ARV combinations containing zidovudine,
didanosine and zalcitabine. In 2000, the Clinical Research
Network was reformulated into the Access to Care Initia-
tive, instigated to provide highly active antiretroviral ther-
apy (HAART) on a service basis [21]. Drug trials and
operational studies under the Clinical Research Initiative
provided not only empirical evidence on clinical out-
comes of tested ART protocols, but also the information
on treatment and care delivery for PLWHA in peripheral
settings, which was helpful to the development of HIV
services in later phases [22]. However, throughout the
1996 to 2001 period, the numbers of ART beneficiaries
were maintained at 2,000 per annum, or approximately
3% to 6% of AIDS-afflicted population. It is noteworthy
that when the Access to Care programme was instigated,
there was no significant campaign for treatment extension
in the public sector. At that time, the very high prices of
ARVs limited coverage of the public ART services, a factor
understood by NGOs and other treatment advocates [8].
The ART programme managers and HIV experts consid-
ered that international treatment guidelines had shifted
from dual-therapy to HAART, and Thailand had gained
considerable experience on treatment provision from the
previous phase. In the absence of political pressure, the
MoPH's AIDS Division set up the annual targets of this
service-based initiative according to the resources availa-
ble.
A dramatic policy shift took place in late-2001 as the
newly elected government pledged to provide free treat-
ment to all clinically eligible people living with HIV/AIDS
(PLWHA) through the recently instigated Universal
Health Coverage (UC) plan [23]. Thereafter, treatment
targets escalated, from 6,500 in 2002 to 23,000 and
50,000 in 2003 and 2004, respectively. ART continued to
be financed from the Health Ministry budget until it was
integrated into the UC benefit package in 2005 [24].
In the following section, we analyse how far cost-effective-
ness information and other contributing factors influ-
enced policy over two periods: the replacement of limited
ARV monotherapy service with the collaborative Clinical
Research Network in 1996, and the adoption of universal
ART policy in 2001.
The establishment of the Clinical Research 
Network
Within four years after AZT was introduced, evidence from
developed countries suggested limited clinical benefits
from single-drug regimens. By the mid 1990s, demand for
therapy in Thailand had risen sharply [20]. Policy makers
in the Ministry of Health were faced with two questions:
would publicly-subsidised ART offer value for money, and
to what extent could the public sector afford the escalating
programme costs? In 1994 the Health Ministry requested
technical support from the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the World Bank to conduct a review of the
existing treatment policies, as well as to examine the effi-
ciency and affordability of possible alternatives. Based on
the projections of HIV distribution in the Thai population
and the costs and clinical outcomes of different treatment
and prevention interventions, the study suggested that the
use of ARVs available in the country, including AZT, dida-
nosine and zalcitabine, for therapeutic purpose was con-
siderably less cost-effective than the introduction of AZT
prophylaxis to reduce mother-to-child HIV transmission
[25]. For instance, the effectiveness to cost ratio of admin-
istering ARV in AIDS cases was 30 QALYs per million
baht, while the corresponding ratio in the case of AZT plus
breast-milk substitute was more than 600 QALYs per mil-
lion baht [25:312]. Moreover, the fiscal assessment indi-
cated that universally providing ARVs for therapeutic
purposes would be unaffordable, as the financial require-
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ments in such cases ranged from 2 to 6 times the total HIV
budget. In contrast, providing AZT and infant formula to
prevent vertical transmission in all HIV-positive mothers
would consume only 16% of the total HIV budget.
Senior health officials noted that, in response to the
study's findings, the Health Ministry had two options: to
terminate ARV supply of AZT, didanosine and zalcitabine
to hospitals or to improve the efficiency of the treatment
programme [20]. The shift in the national ART policy
from a service-based programme to the more selective
Clinical Research Network of 50 hospitals in 1996 was
influenced by the findings of the study, which suggested
that providing universal coverage of anti-retroviral medi-
cines would not be financially feasible. At the same time,
the increase in AIDS cases was considered an opportunity
to assess more systematically the effectiveness and safety
of different ARV protocols (which were moving from
monotherapy to combination therapies), as well as to
identify appropriate regimens for use in the country.
In this shift in policy empirical information derived from
programme reviews, epidemiological projections and
cost-effectiveness analyses [20,25] had a crucial role in the
reallocation of HIV budget. It could be argued that, how-
ever, such evidence might have been generated to justify
the decision to terminate the service-based ART initiative.
Implementing the clinical research project would have
been an acceptable policy option to maintain treatment
delivery to a limited number of patients. According to
AIDS officials, even before commissioning the pro-
gramme evaluation, the Health Ministry had realised that
public finances would be unable to meet the growing
demand for ARVs:
'In the first years of fully subsidised ARV supply, physicians and
hospital administrators were interested in HIV/AIDS care. One
of the reasons was they received ARVs without any need to
negotiate for more budget. ... From 1994, the MoPH's AIDS
Division reached its full capacity of supply because of over-
whelming requests.' [20:431]
It is noteworthy that in 1994 the coverage of ART offered
through the public initiative was only 6% of the popula-
tion in need. Projecting the fiscal burden of providing uni-
versal access to treatment was thus compelling evidence of
the unaffordability of programme costs [20]. On the other
hand, the MoPH was in a difficult position, explaining
any discontinuation of ARV services. Establishing the
Clinical Research Network met the need to improve the
quality of care being provided, at the same time as limit-
ing the numbers treated in the public health system. It
Thailand's national ART programme development, 1992–2004Figure 1
Thailand's national ART programme development, 1992–2004. Source: Bureau of AIDS, Tuberculosis and Sexually-transmitted 
Infections.
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could be said this re-focus of the policy was skilfully han-
dled, and there was no significant negative reaction from
civil society groups.
The adoption of universal ART policy
In 2001 the new government introduced, as part of pre-
election promises, a reform of health care financing, insti-
gating the universal health coverage plan (UC), which
aimed to ensure equitable access to essential health serv-
ices among Thai people [26]. Given the high costs of
HAART regimens, including HAART in UC was a signifi-
cant challenge, since it meant that medication coverage
needed to be scaled up over 30 times in order to meet the
existing needs of 60,000 AIDS-afflicted individuals. This
number was expected to rise over time owing to the grow-
ing number of full-blown HIV cases, but also to the
increase in patient survival due to improved ART access.
Between February and October 2001, there were intense
campaigns run by ART advocate coalitions, which
included, for example 53 PLWHA organizations under the
Thai Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS; the
National AIDS NGO Network; Drug Study Group; the
Thai AIDS Society; the Thai Lawyers Association; individ-
ual scientists from the Government Pharmaceutical
Organization; experts on intellectual property laws; and
HIV clinicians from medical institutes [8]. While NGOs
and PLWHA networks played an explicit role in organiz-
ing public fora and communicating with the Health Min-
ister and respective health officials, other organizations
provided technical and information support on clinical
outcomes, prices, generic availability, patent status of
ARVs, and related regulations. The discourse among these
groups pointed to the clinical benefits of therapy in for-
eign countries and Thai settings, as well as emphasising
ideals such as human rights, ethics and equity [27,28]. Re-
assessing the costs and consequences of medication were
among the issues raised by NGO leaders among others
[8], because of rapid changes in medicines available,
decreasing prices, and demonstrable successes in treat-
ment in countries such as Brazil. Some HIV specialists also
encouraged the MoPH to undertake economic appraisals
of ARV medication, comparing such interventions with
those for chronic conditions such as diabetes and cardio-
vascular diseases, which were subsidised by the UC plan,
since they anticipated that ART administration would be
more cost-effective [29]. Despite these suggestions, no
economic evaluation of therapy was carried out in Thai
context before the policy change.
An analysis of ART policy process in this crucial period
between March and November 2001 suggests that apart
from the intense domestic treatment advocacy by civil
society organisations, programme expansion was facili-
tated by several other factors discussed in greater detail in
Tantivess [8]. Among these were: changes in the adminis-
tration; involvement of new actors (such as the new
Health Minister, health system reformists, NGOs and
PLWHA coalitions); a relatively well-developed health
delivery system; lessons learned from small-scale treat-
ment initiatives; and the global campaign to promote ART
access in resource-poor countries, and generic ARV pro-
duction by the government laboratory and subsequent
price reduction [8]. Such elements together legitimised
the shift in policy by enhancing the affordability, feasibil-
ity, and political desirability of universal ART provision
through public health services. Of these, the substantial
decrease in drug prices owing to local generic production
was critical. NGO-PLWHA networks made use of such
information to encourage the MoPH to extend treatment
to cover all people in need, as doing so would become
affordable. Policy discussion took place in the context of
health care financing reforms, which facilitated the pro-
posal for policy changes. The UC introduction and ART
scale up shared the underlying ideal that it was people's
right to access all essential health services.
Discussion and conclusion
Policy making in HIV is complex because the causes, man-
ifestations and implications of the epidemic are multi-
dimensional, involving socioeconomic, political and
health factors. The policy environment has also been
extremely dynamic, as knowledge has advanced since the
early 1980s. Since most HIV-afflicted people are margin-
alised and vulnerable to deprivation, the extent to which
they can access proper care and treatment largely relies on
public services [30]. To address these challenges, employ-
ing only efficiency-directed cost-effectiveness analysis in
assessing the values of HIV interventions is inadequate.
Laxminarayan and colleagues [31:1197] have argued
'Cost-effectiveness is only one consideration in allocating
resources to specific diseases and interventions; epidemiological,
medical, political, ethical, cultural, and budgetary factors also
affect such decisions.'
Economic evaluations suggest that ART in poor countries
does not offer value for money since therapy is less cost-
effective than HIV prevention interventions [32,33]. Fol-
lowing Creese and colleagues [32], the cost per DALY
gained in ART introduction in African settings is approxi-
mately US$1,100–1,800, while less than US$100 is
required to achieve the same benefit if particular preven-
tive measures, such as condoms (US$1–99), peer educa-
tion for commercial sex workers (US$4–7), diagnosis and
treatment of sexually-transmitted infections (US$12), and
voluntary counselling and HIV testing (US$18–22), is
implemented. For some, this suggests that resources
should be concentrated on prevention programmes rather
than therapy. For others, therapy cannot be denied. Boe-
laert and colleagues [17] argue that the rationale for treat-
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ment provision in industrialised societies is not based on
cost-effectiveness, but on its contribution to the reduction
of HIV-related morbidity and mortality as well as the
improved quality of life of PLWHA. In the same vein, ART
scaling up in the South over recent years was not guided
by results of economic evaluation. Further, existing eco-
nomic appraisals are limited, usually do not capture or
quantify the benefit of ARV treatment on socioeconomic
development [34]. These studies therefore neglect the
potential positive externalities of ART – for example
encouraging people to seek counselling and testing [35].
Overall, it seems that policies to roll out ART in poor
countries have been propelled by factors other than cost
effectiveness considerations, and in spite of perceptions
that treatment is often not cost effective. It is probably the
case that in many low-income countries with high HIV
prevalence, ART roll-out has been strongly influenced by
the global discourse on expanding access to treatment, as
well as significantly increased financial and technical sup-
port through different international initiatives [36].
In this paper we suggest that the information on cost-
effectiveness played a role in the first shift in policy – with
the result of limiting, rather than expanding ART. How-
ever, it could be argued that the termination of service-
based therapy programme was guided by the projected
financial burden of the programme, rather than the cost-
effectiveness information. Indeed, the, findings from eco-
nomic evaluations can be used to inform resource alloca-
tion in several ways. Although the study commissioned by
the MoPH in 1995 suggested that ART for adults was less
cost-effective than most HIV prevention interventions, at
33,300 baht per QALY gained, the medication could have
been justified. This is because when the cost per QALY
gained is compared with the national ability to pay, the
benchmark usually used is the cost per QALY gained
should be less than three times of gross national product
[37]. Given that GNP in Thailand was 69,800 baht in
1995, some could have argued that it was therefore cost-
effective to introduce ART. However, others argue that
even cost-effective interventions are not always afforda-
ble. Long term concerns about the costs and affordability
of ART continued to shape national treatment policies
until the policy change in 2001. Clearly the dramatic deci-
sion that year to include ART in the universal coverage
scheme was influenced by other factors than costs or effec-
tiveness, with policy justification resting on ideological
considerations around human rights, ethics and equity.
Admittedly the considerable reduction in prices which
alleviated the cost of expansion, and implicitly improved
the cost-effectiveness of ARVs was also crucial in contrib-
uting to the change in policy.
In the analysis of policy, caveats are in order. This paper is
based on an analysis of the policy process in the public
sector, and not specifically on the attitudes of Thai policy
makers towards particular techniques of resource alloca-
tion and prioritisation. Moreover, the paper focuses on
ARV therapy – an intervention with unique characteristics
– so the conclusions reached may not be generalisable to
other policies. The medicines prescribed in ART have
changed over time and while prices have fallen they
remain expensive; ART is demanded by large numbers of
patients and is used for an incurable disease for which pre-
vention measures are obviously more cost-effective; ART
is complicated to administer; and may cause both desira-
ble and undesirable externalities. Finally there has been
global commitment to expanding access to ARVs. These
features shaped the decisions on publicly-subsidised serv-
ice provision in Thailand, and may not be comparable
with decision making on other health interventions. Fur-
thermore, this study emphasises the extension of treat-
ment delivery under the national programme organised
by the Health Ministry. It excludes the adoption of ARV
medication in the private sector or in the country's health
benefit plans.
It is noteworthy that although the pledge to include ART
in the UC benefit package was made in 2001, treatment
costs were only formally covered by the Plan in 2005. This
was because negotiations were necessary between the
MoPH's Disease Control Department, which had been
responsible for treatment provision since 1992, and the
UC plan managers [8]. The transfer of programme super-
vision and ARV procurement roles as well as correspond-
ing budgets was protracted and took time to resolve.
Meanwhile, NGO coalitions continued to advocate for
ARV-based therapy as one of the UC benefits, as they
believed that this would assure the sustainability of treat-
ment provision.
In conclusion, the allocation of public resources to subsi-
dise ART in Thailand has always been driven by policy
considerations of resource availability and affordability.
However, at certain points in the policy process, other
motivations, specifically over human rights and equity,
were extremely important in providing the impetus for
radical change. The sustainability of ART programme in
Thailand remains uncertain. The drug costs may escalate
dramatically if viral resistance to the current first-line reg-
imens develops among large proportions of the treated
population, resulting in the rising demand for expensive,
imported original ARV products. International and bilat-
eral regulations on trade-related intellectual property
rights protection are other threats. While the production
of many new generic ARVs including indinavir, ritonavir
and saquinavir, as well as other drugs in new dosage forms
and fix-dose combinations [38] has expanded the capacity
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of the ART programme, there is a continuing battle over
market exclusivity of pharmaceutical products as a result
of Thai-US Free Trade Agreements which may threaten the
price and production of these drugs in the future [39].
Competing interests
The author(s) declare that they have no competing inter-
ests.
Acknowledgements
This paper was based on an analysis of the decision making to allocate 
healthcare resources in Thailand as part of the Setting Priorities using Infor-
mation on Cost-Effectiveness (SPICE) project, and is supported by an inter-
national collaborative research grant from the Wellcome Trust, United 
Kingdom (071842/Z/03/Z); and the National Health and Medicine Research 
Council of Australia (301199). The authors thank Stephen Lim for his help-
ful comments on an earlier draft.
References
1. Detels R, Tarwater P, Phair JP, Margolick JP, Riddle SA, Munoz A:
Effectiveness of potent antiretroviral therapies on the inci-
dence of opportunistic infections before and after AIDS diag-
nosis.  AIDS 2001, 15(3):347-355.
2. Gange SJ, Barron Y, Greenblatt RM, Anastos K, H M, Young M: Effec-
tiveness of highly active antiretroviral therapy among HIV-1
infected women.  J Epidemiol Community Health 2002, 56:153-159.
3. Nieuwkerk PT, Gisolf EH, Reijers MH, Lange JMA, Danner SA,
Sprangers MA: Long-term quality of life outcomes in three
antiretroviral treatment strategies for HIV-1 infection.  AIDS
2001, 15(15):1985-1991.
4. WHO/UNAIDS: Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretro-
viral Therapy: A Report on "3 by 5" and Beyond, March 2006.
Geneva ; 2006. 
5. Kumaranayake L: Economies of scale-up? The cost of expand-
ing access.   [http://www.id21.org/insights/insights-h02/insights-
issh02-art05.html].
6. Zwi AB, Mills A: Health policy in less developed countries: past
trends and future directions.  Journal of International Development
1995, 7(3):299-328.
7. Hutubessy RCW, Bendib LM, Evans DB: Critical issues in the eco-
nomic evaluation of interventions against communicable dis-
eases.  Acta Tropica 2001, 78:191-206.
8. Tantivess S: Universal access to antiretroviral therapy in Thai-
land: an analysis of the policy process.  PhD thesis.  London,
University of London; 2006. 
9. Galvao J: Access to antiretroviral drugs in Brazil.  Lancet 2002,
360:1862-1865.
10. del Rio C, Sepulveda J: AIDS in Mexico: lessons learned and
implications for developing countries.  AIDS 2002,
16:1445-1457.
11. Katzenstein D, Laga M, Moatti JP: The evaluation of HIV/AIDS
Drug Access Initiatives in Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal and
Uganda: how access to antiretroviral treatment can become
feasible in Africa.  AIDS 2003, 17((Suppl 3)):S1-S4.
12. Okubagzi G, Singh S: Establishing an HIV/AIDS programme in
developing countries: the Ethiopian experience.  AIDS 2002,
16:1575-1586.
13. Desclaux A, Ciss M, Taverne B, Sow PS, Egrot M, Faye MA, Laniece I,
Sylla O, Delaporte E, N'Doye I: Access to antiretroviral drugs
and AIDS management in Senegal.  AIDS 2003, 17((Suppl
3)):S95-S101.
14. Chequer P, Cuchi P, Mazin R, Calleja JMG: Access to antiretroviral
treatment in Latin American countries and the Caribbean.
AIDS 2002, 16((Suppl 3)):S50-S57.
15. Saba J: Providing Wider Access to HIV-related Drugs in
Developing Countries: UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative
- the Pilot Phase: June 5-6 1998; London.   ; 1998. 
16. UNAIDS: Accelerating access to HIV/AIDS care, treatment
and support: background paper: October 4 2001; New York. 
; 2001. 
17. Boelaert M, Van-Damme W, Meessen B, Van-der-Stuyft P: The
AIDS crisis, cost-effectiveness and academic activism.  Tropi-
cal Medicine and International Health 2002, 7(12):1001-1002.
18. AIDS Division: Report on HIV/AIDS and STI in Thailand.  Bang-
kok , The Intersessional Meeting of the Human Security Network on
Human Security and HIV/AIDS; 2002. 
19. Thai Working Group on HIV/AIDS Projections: Projections for
HIV/AIDS in Thailand: 2000-2020.  Nonthaburi , Ministry of Pub-
lic Health; 2001. 
20. Kunanusont C, Phoolcharoen W, Bodaramik Y: Evolution of Med-
ical Services for HIV/AIDS in Thailand.  Journal of the Medical
Association of Thailand 1999, 82(5):425-434.
21. Satasit P, Kuaykiatikul P, On-Nom C: The Medical Services for
PLWH/A and Monitoring System Development: Program's
Activities and Performance.  Nonthaburi , AIDS Division,
Department of Communicable Disease Control; 2002. 
22. Ministry of Public Health: The Medical Services for PLWHA and
Monitoring System Development: Operational Guidelines.
Nonthaburi , Department of Communicable Disease Control, AIDS
Division; 2001. 
23. Thanprasertsuk S, Lertpiriyasuwat C, Chasombat S: Developing a
National Antiretroviral Programme for People with HIV/
AIDS: the Experience of Thailand.  In AIDS in Asia: The Challenge
Ahead Edited by: Narain JP. New Delhi , WHO, Regional Office for
South-East Asia; 2004. 
24. Sakulpanich T: How to Provide Universal and Sustainable ART:
14 July; Bangkok.   ; 2005. 
25. Prescott N: Policy options for antiretroviral treatment.  In The
implications of antiretroviral treatments: Informal consultation Edited by:
van Praag E, Fernyak S, Katz AM. Geneva , WHO; 1997. 
26. Jongudomsuk P: Towards universal health coverage.  Non-
thaburi , National Health Security Office; 2004. 
27. Ungphakorn J: Political Support and Advocacy: Experiences in
Thailand: 12-16 February; Bangkok.   Ministry of Public Health;
2001. 
28. Tan-ud P, Panichpak P: The policy to integrate antiretroviral
drugs to Universal Health Coverage Plan (letter to the
Prime Minister dated 27 November 2001).  Bangkok , Thai Net-
work for People Living with HIV/AIDS; 2001. 
29. Matichon: Appeal for equal subsidy for AIDS drugs.  In Matichon
newspaper Bangkok .  November1, 2001: pp.7
30. UNAIDS: 2004 Report on the global AIDS: 4th global report.
Geneva ; 2004. 
31. Laxminarayan R, Mills AJ, Breman JG, Measham AR, Alleyne G, Clae-
son M, Jha P, Musgrove P, Chow J, Shahid-Salles S, Jamison DT:
Advancement of global health: key messages from the Dis-
ease Control Priorities Project.  Lancet 2006, 367:1193-1208.
32. Creese A, Floyd K, Alban A, Guinness L: Cost-effectiveness of
HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa: a systematic review of the
evidence.  Lancet 2002, 359:1635-1642.
33. Marseille E, Hofmann PB, Khan JG: HIV prevention before
HAART in sub-Saharan Africa.  Lancet 2002, 359:1851-1856.
34. van Dam J, Hutchinson SA: Access to treatment for HIV/AIDS:
Meeting of International Experts.  Washington DC , Population
Council; 2002. 
35. von Schoen Angerer T, Wilson D, Ford N, Kasper T: Access and
activism: the ethics of providing antiretroviral therapy in
developing countries.  AIDS 2001, 15(suppl 5):S81-S90.
36. Steinbrook R: After Bangkok - Expanding the Global Response
to AIDS.  N Engl J Med 2004, 351(8):738-742.
37. Commission on Macroeconomics and Health: Macroeconomics
and health: investing in health for economic development.
Geneva , World Health Organization; 2001. 
38. Ake-sangsri A: ARV Research & Development by the Govern-
ment Pharmaceutical Organisation: 14 July; Bangkok.   ;
2005. 
39. FTA Watch Group: "Sovereignty Not For Sale", say Thailand's
civil society in opposing the government's free trade agree-
ments (FTAs).   [http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/
show_page.php?t=3&s_id=8&d_id=8].
